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REPORT

OF THE

SENATE ARMS CONTROL OBSERVER GROUP DELEGATION

TO THE

OPENING OF THE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

MARCH 9–12, 1985

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ARMS CONTROL OBSERVER GROUP

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Ex officio

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Ex officio

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FOREWORD

This report summarizes the origin and activities of the Senate Arms Control Observer Group, its initial visit to Geneva and plans for future action.[1] It refrains from any substantive discussion of the issues under negotiation in accord with the understanding on confidentiality in the negotiations which we are committed to honor. Within the limits of that understanding, however, it does express several viewpoints that the Group has stated publicly in regard to various aspects of the negotiations with th Soviet Union in this critical arena.

From March 9–12, we led a delegation of 10 Senators from the newly-formed Senate Arms Control Observer Group to the opening session of the renewed arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union at Geneva. The trip had three overall purposes: first, to underscore Senate support for the arms control efforts of the President; second, to emphasize the high priority that the Senate places on these negotiations; and, third, to begin a special Senate monitoring process designed to fulfill more adequately the Senate's constitutional role in the treaty-making process.

We believe this trip was a success in all respects.

As we wrote [2] to President Reagan on March 13, upon our return to Washington, we believe that we demonstrated three things: (1) the broad bipartisan support of the Senate for the Administration's arms control efforts; (2) our determination to be as patient as necessary to achieve a sound agreement; and (3) the seriousness with which the Senate, including the Observer Group, intends to fulfill its constitutionally-mandated role in the treaty-making process. While we emphasized that we did not go to Geneva to act as negotiators, we had two important missions: (1) to consult with and advise our negotiating team; and (2) to monitor and report to the Senate on the progress and development of the talks.

We had several opportunities to confer with our negotiators before the commencement of the talks, and we had a useful debriefing from them immediately after the conclusion of the first meeting with the Soviets. Two of our members, Senators Gore and Stevens, remained to attend the briefing and debriefing sessions on the second day of formal negotiations. Each of the sessions with the negotiating team was structured to permit us the full opportunity to present our views and questions to the team and to engage in a candid and confidential exchange of ideas and information. Through this continuing process of monitoring the negotiations, we are confident that the Senate will be in a much better position to consider any resulting treaty.

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[1] We provided a preliminary report to the Senate on the Senate floor on March 14, 1985—the text is included at the conclusion of this report at Appendix L.

[2] The letter is included at the conclusion of this report at Appendix K.

Our negotiating team, comprised of Ambassadors Max Kampelman, John Tower, Mike Glitman, and their deputies provided useful briefings on the substance of the negotiations, and we are confident that this team will be a credit to our nation as the negotiations go forward.

BOB DOLE,
Majority Leader.
ROBERT C. BYRD,
Minority Leader.

Origin and Summary of Activities

THE SENATE ARMS CONTROL OBSERVER GROUP

Background

On March 12, 1985, arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union resumed after a hiatus of some 15 months, a hiatus which had resulted from the breaking off of negotiations on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and START by the Soviet Union in, respectively, November and December 1983. Because of the importance of these new negotiations, at the initiative of the Majority and Minority leaders, the Senate created a new Senate body, the Senate Arms Control Observer Group, to monitor them. This was the major item of Senate business on the first day of the 99th Congress, January 3, 1985, (S. Res. 19).[3]

The Observer Group is a bipartisan body of five Senators from each party, as well as the Majority and Minority leaders as ex officio members. In addition to the ex officio members, the group consists of Senators Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), Sam Nunn (D-Georgia), Richard Lugar (R-Indiana), and Claiborne Pell (D-Rhode Island) as co-chairmen, and Senators Al Gore (D-Tennessee), Ted Kennedy (D-Massachusetts), Pat Moynihan (D-New York), Don Nickles (R-Oklahoma), John Warner (R-Virginia), and Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyoming). A delegation consisting of eight of the ten Senators in the Arms Control Observer Group, and headed by the two leaders, attended the opening session of these negotiations from March 9–12 in Geneva.[4]

The United States Senate has the constitutional responsibility of providing advice and consent in the making of treaties. This responsibility imposes upon Senators the obligation to become as knowledgeable as possible concerning the salient issues which are being addressed in the context of the negotiating process. Any accord with the Soviet Union to control or reduce our strategic weapons carries considerable weight for our nation. It will vitally affect our national security, the security of all our constituents, and the security of our allies. Such an agreement, or agreements, must be supported by a substantial national consensus to stand the test of time. Such a consensus is best achieved through the traditional treaty-making process which has been followed in the field of strategic arms control agreements entered into by the United States.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has jurisdictional and oversight responsibility with regard to arms control negotia-

[3] The resolution and supporting statements are included at the conclusion of this report at Appendix C.

[4] Senators Moynihan and Wallop were unable to attend due to other pressing Senate business.

tions and agreements. It is the purpose of the Senate Arms Control Observer Group to supplement the activities of the Foreign Relations Committee by providing a more regular and systematic involvement of the full Senate in the negotiations, without in any sense assuming the role of participants or negotiators in these talks. While the Foreign Relations Committee oversees arms control negotiations on a continuing basis, the full Senate has focused its attention in the past only sporadically on the vital aspects of arms control negotiations, usually developing a knowledge and understanding of the issues being negotiated after the fact—that is, after a draft treaty has been signed by the Executive branch. The result of this fitful process has been generally unsatisfactory in recent years. We seek to avoid a recurrence of the problems of the 1970's, when three successive arms control treaties, signed by three Presidents, were never approved for ratification by the Senate. These include the SALT II Treaty of 1979, the Threshhold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976.

In fulfillment of our constitutional responsibility in providing advice and consent in the making of treaties, we believe it is necessary to become completely conversant concerning the particular issues under negotiation. We believe that such knowledge is critical to the understanding by the Senate of the issues involved, and that an intimate knowledge of the evolving issues will permit our negotiators to have the benefit of our advice and counsel, when appropriate, on a continuing basis during the course of the negotiations. We believe that the Senate will be in a far better position to evaluate any agreement which may be reached and that such agreement might benefit from the reactions of the Senate as it is being formulated. We also firmly believe that the interplay of ideas that has occurred and will continue to occur with the members of our observer team will be of assistance to our negotiators.

In the event that the negotiations fail, the Senate will be in a better position to understand and to make comprehensible to the American people just why that failure occurred. This is particularly important in light of the staggering complexity of the issues now being negotiated in Geneva.

Chronology and Functioning of the Observer Group

The philosophy underlying the creation of the Observer Group, and the mechanisms of coordination with the Executive branch necessary for its effective operation, were the subject of a series of resolutions, letters, and meetings from December 1984 to April 1985. In December 1984, Senate Majority Leader-elect Dole decided to introduce a resolution in the 99th Congress aimed at underscoring the strong support in the Senate for the President's arms control efforts. To emphasize the importance of this issue, Senator Dole planned to make this resolution the first substantive act of his leadership and to seek affirmative action on it the first day of the new Congress, January 3, 1985. Further, to demonstrate the bipartisan nature of the support which he believed existed in the

Senate, Senator Dole early on sought the participation and cooperation in the effort of Senate Minority Leader Robert C. Byrd.

Simultaneously, Senator Byrd was already pursuing the possiblity of creating a Senate arms control observer group. His initial proposal in this regard was made by telephone to President Reagan on December 9, 1984. Senator Byrd suggested that a small, bipartisan group of Senators, recommended by the Senate leadership, be appointed as official observers on our delegation to any arms control negotiations which might result from the meetings to be held in Geneva between Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Geneva on January 7–8, 1985. The reaction by the President was enthusiastic and positive, and Senator Byrd followed up this initial discussion with a letter to the President outlining his proposal on December 13, 1984.

In follow-up discussions, Senators Dole and Byrd agreed to meld their approaches in a single resolution, including the concept of an observer group. Senator Dole broached this idea with the Administration and, on January 2, 1985, Acting Secretary of State Kenneth Dam wrote to Senator Dole providing a positive Administration reaction to the proposal. He indicated that an Observer Group would be welcomed by the Administration and that the Group would be provided full briefings by our negotiators to any arms control talks which might emerge. Further, he indicated that the Administration would seek to have the Senators meet on an informal basis with the Soviet delegates as well.

On the basis of this dialogue, the Senate passed S. Res. 19, sponsored jointly by Senators Dole and Byrd, on January 3, 1985, the first day of the 99th Congress.

It recommended in Section (5) that "the President include, as official observers on the United States delegation to any formal negotiations which take place, a bipartisan group of Senators, designated upon the recommendation of the Majority Leader and the Minority Leader of the Senate."

On January 5, 1985, Secretary Shultz wrote to Senator Dole welcoming the formation of the Group, and on January 9 the two leaders wrote to the President recommending that ten Senators, five from each side of the aisle, in addition to the two leaders in an ex officio capacity, serve as official observers.

On January 25, 1985, Secretary Shultz wrote to co-chairmen Nunn and Stevens offering regular Administration briefings to the group, encouraging the group to travel to the negotiating site during the talks, and offering to include the Senators in internal delegation meetings and to arrange opportunities to meet with the Soviet negotiators in informal sessions.

On February 28, 1985, the Senate passed S. Res. 86, [5] a Dole-Byrd resolution funding the Observer Group, naming the four co-chairmen, establishing a core and leadership staff group, and establishing provisions for studies and consultants.

The Group is not a Committee of the Senate, and has no legislative or formal oversight function. It is not a forum to vote on any matter. Rather, reflecting our desire to provide a bipartisan moni-

[5] The text of the resolution is included at the conclusion of this report at Appendix H.

toring group which will be of assistance to the Senate leadership, the Foreign Relations Committee, and the full Senate, when and if agreements are presented to the Senate for its advice and consent, S. Res. 86 provides that—

(a) The Group shall be headed by four Senators, two from each party, serving as co-chairmen—Ted Stevens of Alaska, Richard Lugar of Indiana, Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island, and Sam Nunn of Georgia. The chairman, for administrative purposes, is Ted Stevens.

(b) There shall be a small core staff group, which will serve all members of the Observer Group on a bipartisan basis. Each of the four co-chairmen and each of the two leaders is to designate one staff person. In addition, two secretaries are authorized.

(c) Adequate provision for staff compensation and expenses for travel and consultants.

Since passage of S. Res. 86, the co-chairmen, under Senator Stevens' administrative direction, have arranged for weekly briefings by the Administration on the status of the negotiations, and for provision of classified materials on a regular basis. In the interests of security, access to the classified documentation provided by the Executive branch to the Observer Group and access to the classified briefing sessions provided by the Executive branch has been limited to the six staff designees.

The Group intends to provide for coverage of the negotiations in Geneva by individual Senators on the Observer Group as frequently as Senate business will permit. The Majority and Minority leaders, as ex officio members of the Group, also intend each to designate from time to time, one other Senator not a permanent member of the Observer Group, to stand in their stead in monitoring the Geneva negotiations.

Prior to the Group's initial delegation trip to Geneva, the co-chairmen arranged for a highly useful series of briefings on the full range of issues confronting the negotiations. These were as follows:

February 4—Meeting with General Brent Scowcroft, Mr. Walt Slocombe and Mr. Eugene Rostow on lessons of SALT I, SALT II, and START.

February 4—Meeting with Ambassador Paul Nitze on the "New U.S. Strategic Concept."

February 5—Meeting with Admiral Thomas Moorer, Mr. James Woolsey, and Dr. Lawrence Kupperman on offensive force issues.

February 7—Meeting with Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Dr. James Schlesinger, Dr. Barry Blechman and Mr. David Williamson on SDI.

February 19—Meeting with General Ellis and Mr. Doug George on Soviet Compliance.

February 21—Group attended American Association for the Advancement of Science breakfast on the Strategic Defense Initiative.

February 26—Meeting with Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger and Mr. Paul Warnke on Allied interests.

February 28—Meeting with Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin.

March 7—Meeting with Secretary George Shultz, Ambassador Paul Nitze, Ambassador Edward Rowney, and Mr. Ken Adelman on U.S. preparations for Geneva talks.

On March 9–12, 1985, the delegation travelled to Geneva to monitor the opening session of the renewed arms control meetings with the Soviets.

On March 12, 1985, the Observer Group conducted a press conference in Geneva and issued a joint statement on the formation and objectives of the Group.

On March 13, 1985, upon returning from the delegation visit to Geneva, Senators Dole and Byrd wrote to President Reagan summarizing their views on the first negotiating session and the successful achievement of the goals of the Observer Group.

On March 14, 1985, Senators Dole and Byrd delivered a preliminary report to the Senate, in floor remarks, on the delegation visit.

Senator Ted Stevens returned to Geneva during the period April 15–18, 1985, and his report is included as Appendix M.

The specific documents are included in the Appendices at the end of this report.

Delegation Visit to Geneva

The delegation arrived in Geneva late in the evening of Saturday, March 9, 1985. It hosted an official dinner for our negotiating team (three chief negotiators and their four deputies) on the evening of Sunday, March 10. On Monday morning, March 11, the Observer Group was provided a full classified briefing on the U.S. approach and objectives in the negotiations by the three deputy negotiators, Ronald Lehman, John Woodworth, and Henry F. Cooper and Executive Secretary Warren Zimmerman. On Monday evening, our negotiators hosted a reception for our delegation. On Tuesday, March 12, the opening day of the renewed talks with the Soviets, Ambassador Kampelman hosted a private briefing for the delegation prior to the U.S.–U.S.S.R. Heads of Delegation meeting. During the first formal U.S./Soviet meeting, the Group held a press conference.[6] Immediately after the conclusion of the first meeting, the delegation attended a comprehensive classified debriefing by our negotiators on the details of that session.

The passing of Soviet President Chernenko was announced on Monday, March 11, and the Group went to the Soviet embassy to express its formal condolences on Tuesday morning. The death of President Chernenko and the rapid transition of power in the Soviet system to Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev did not affect the schedule of negotiations. However, an informal meeting with the Soviet negotiators, hosted by the American negotiators, scheduled for late Tuesday afternoon was cancelled. While expressing their regrets due to the circumstances, the Soviet negotiators accepted in principle the proposition of meeting with the Observer Group on future occasions.

During the meetings the delegation had with our negotiating team, we engaged in an extensive dialogue regarding the issues on the negotiating table. We believe the exchanges of views were beneficial. Because we intend to observe the agreement on confidential-

[6] The full transcript of the press conference is included at the conclusion of this report at Appendix J.

ity of the talks reached by our own negotiators, a detailed recitation of those exchanges cannot be recounted. We would thus limit our commentary on our discussions with our negotiators to the following points:

(1) We are very concerned about Soviet violations of past accords and desire that the Soviet negotiators be impressed with the fact that such violations degrade the prospects for future agreements to be approved by the Senate. The question of Soviet adherence to past accords must be resolved in a satisfactory way, in the context of the ongoing negotiations in the U.S./Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), and if required, through high-level diplomatic channels.

(2) We believe the complexity of the issues on the negotiating tables in Geneva today indicates that the current negotiations may last for an extended period of time, perhaps years, even if both sides are making a serious effort in good faith. Past experience strongly suggests that this may be the case. We therefore will attempt to do what we can to temper any ill-founded expectations of the American people for an all-encompassing agreement in a short period of time. We are prepared to stick with the process for as long as it takes to reach solid agreements which merit approval by the Senate.

(3) Given the nature of past negotiations with the Soviets, we believe we should approach these talks with creativity and flexibility consistent with the security requirements of the United States and its friends and allies. We will support all efforts to put forward imaginative proposals. We believe, in effect, that our side should assiduously pursue solutions to the difficult questions confronting the negotiating parties.

We do not feel that the negotiators on either side should violate the rule of confidentiality on which they have agreed by public discussion of part or all of a particular negotiating stance. Shortly after the opening of these negotiations, Soviet leaders and negotiators made such public statements for political purposes on positions taken in the confidential negotiating sessions. The Administration subsequently felt it should provide a response. Public discussion, such as was initiated by the Soviet side, will damage the integrity and credibility of the negotiating process and degrade the opportunities to reach a satisfactory conclusion to the negotiations.

We do not believe that there is any evidence that the field of arms control, any more than any other field of human endeavor, is bereft of new ideas. If the Soviets are willing to match our good faith and creativity, solutions to the major issues of stability, verification and reductions can surely be found.

Table of Appendices

A. Letter from Senator Robert C. Byrd to President Reagan of December 13, 1984.

B. Letter from Acting Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam to Senator Bob Dole of January 2, 1985.

C. Text of Senate Resolution 19, passed on January 3, 1985, relating to the upcoming meeting in Geneva of the Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister, and remarks on the

Senate floor by Senators Bob Dole and Robert C. Byrd in support.

D. Letter from Secretary of State Shultz to Senator Dole of January 5, 1985.

E. Letters from Senators Bob Dole and Robert C. Byrd to President Reagan of January 9, 1985.

F. Letter from Secretary of State Shultz to Senator Nunn of January 25, 1985.

G. Letter from Senator Robert C. Byrd to Secretary of State Shultz of February 1, 1985.

H. Text of Senate Resolution 86, passed on February 28, 1985, relating to the bipartisan group of Senators attending the arms reduction or control negotiations.

I. Press Release and Joint Statement of Observer Group released in Geneva March 12, 1985.

J. Transcript of Press Conference of Observer Group in Geneva, March 12, 1985.

K. Letters from Senators Bob Dole and Robert C. Byrd to President Reagan of March 13, 1985.

L. Remarks on the Senate floor by Senators Bob Dole and Robert C. Byrd reporting on the delegation visit to Geneva, March 14, 1985.

U.S. SENATE,
OFFICE OF THE DEMOCRATIC LEADER,
Washington, DC, December 13, 1984.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: This is to express my sincere appreciation for your positive reaction to my suggestion on December 9, 1984, that Senators be afforded observer status on our delegation to any arms control negotiations which may result from the talks between Secretary of State George Shultz and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Geneva in January 1985.

Also, I appreciate that you indicated it was your intention to discuss my proposal with Secretary Shultz and others. I believe that the inclusion of a small bipartisan group of Senators comprised of an equal number from both parties as observers on our delegation can only enhance the prospects for a successful outcome, should a treaty come before the Senate for ratification. It should be of great benefit to the knowledge and understanding of all Senators if access to the negotiating sessions and related information were to be established on a regularized basis. In addition, the informal reactions and views of Senators to the ongoing talks should be of real value to you and to your negotiators.

I hope you view my suggestion as constructive and an indication of my support for the resumption of arms control negotiations. I look forward to developing the details of this arrangement with you and your representatives in the very near future.

Sincerely,

ROBERT C. BYRD.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, DC, January 2, 1985.

Hon. ROBERT DOLE,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR DOLE: In the Secretary's absence, I would like to follow-up on our breakfast meeting and share some further thoughts with you regarding Senator Byrd's proposal for Senate observers on the negotiating team.

It would aid our efforts if, once formal negotiations are underway, the negotiating team and the Secretary could have available the advice of the Senate on a continuing basis. To this end, in addition to our normal consultations with the Congress, it would be useful if you and Senator Byrd could designate a small group of Senators with which to consult on a regular basis. We would keep this group fully informed on the status of the negotiations: they would also be welcome to meet with the delegations at the negotiations where they would be provided full briefings on the status of the negotiations. We will seek to have them meet with the Soviet delegates as well.

We will discuss this approach with the House Leadership and see if they are interested in forming a similar group.

The Secretary greatly appreciates your draft resolution that supports our efforts to seek meaningful reductions in nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union. It is our hope that in the near future the Soviet Union will be prepared to engage in serious negotiations.

I look forward to working closely with you in the new year.

Sincerely yours,

KENNETH W. DAM,
Acting Secretary.

SENATE RESOLUTION 19—RELATING TO THE UPCOMING MEETING IN GENEVA OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER

Mr. DOLE (for himself and Mr. BYRD) submitted the following resolution; which was considered and agreed to.

S. RES. 19

Whereas the control and reduction of nuclear arms are among the most pressing problems confronting the world;

Whereas all reasonable efforts, consistent with the national security of the United States and the responsibilities of the United States as the leader of the Free World, need to be undertaken in pursuit of nuclear arms control and reduction;

Whereas the issue of nuclear arms control and reduction must be pursued on the basis of the national interest of the United States without regard for partisan considerations;

Whereas the control and reduction of nuclear arms are central to the relations of the United States with the Soviet Union, the only other nation on Earth possessing a comparable nuclear arsenal; and

Whereas the President has declared that one of the highest priority goals of his second administration is to pursue nuclear arms control and reduction talks with the leaders of the Soviet Union which are aimed at the mutual, balanced, and verifiable reduction of the strategic arsenals of both countries: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate hereby—

(1) commends the commitment by the President to make nuclear arms control and reduction talks with the Government of the Soviet Union a high priority goal of his second administration;

(2) offers full support for any effort by the President to engage the Government of the Soviet Union in dialogue and negotiations in pursuit of agreements to control and reduce the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union;

(3) urges the President to approach such talks with creativity and flexibility consistent with the requirements of the security of the United States and the security of those nations that are allies and friends of the United States;

(4) extends to Secretary of State Shultz full support for his efforts and best wishes for success in his meetings with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva January 7–8, which are aimed at setting a more concrete agenda for the resumption of nuclear arms control and reduction negotiations in the immediate future, negotiations to which both the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed; and

(5) recommends that the President include, as official observers on the United States delegation to any formal negotiations which take place, a bipartisan group of Senators, designated upon the recommendation of the Majority Leader and the Minority Leader of the Senate.

SEC. 2. The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy of this resolution to the President.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, this is a day which, by tradition, is largely occupied by important ceremonial and organizational activities. Today, though, with the support of the distinguished minority leader, I would ask that the Senate put aside this tradition briefly and consider immediately one substantive resolution, which I have sent to the desk.

This resolution deals with what may be the most important issue which any of us in the 99th Congress will face: The issue of the control and reduction of nuclear arms.

I need not dwell on the importance of this issue. It is central to our national security. It is central to our relations with our most formidable adversary, the Soviet Union. And it is central to the peace—indeed, to the very existence—of the civilized world as we know it. On these grounds alone, the issue of nuclear arms control is a fitting focus for the first substantive act of this new Senate.

But there is another reason for us to act now. As we all know, Secretary of State Shultz will be leaving for Geneva this Saturday, to engage Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in an initial round of talks aimed at setting an agenda for follow-on arms control negotiations. As he begins those talks, Secretary Shultz needs, and he deserves, our strong support.

If history is a guide, the Russians are going to be tough and effective negotiators. They will try to exploit any chinks they see in our negotiating armor, any divisiveness, any impatience. If we let them know now that we are united in our wish for sound and verifiable arms control agreements—united in our determination to work hard and patiently for such agreements—and united in our support for the administration's efforts to achieve them—our prospects for success will be much greater.

This resolution also serves other ends. It recognizes the success of the administration's strategy in getting these talks started and, in so doing, encourages the continuation of the negotiating process.

It underscores the deep interest of the Senate, as an institution, in nuclear arms control, both as an issue and as a negotiating process. It makes clear that this body intends to play its constitutionally mandated role in helping shape and confirm our country's arms control policies and strategies.

It also recommends a mechanism for appropriate and responsible Senate input into the negotiating process, through a body of designated Senate observers from both sides of the aisle, which, I would say, was the idea of the distinguished minority leader, Senator Byrd. Fully cognizant of the executive's primacy in carrying out our foreign policies, these Senators would not be negotiators. The Secretary of State, or other officials designated by the President, would have the sole authority to speak for our Government to the Soviet representatives in the intricate bargaining process which will inevitably characterize these negotiations. But these Senators would serve as this body's channel for information and feedback as formal negotiations ensue, so the the Senate could more knowledgeably play the ratifying or other role which might later be required.

The distinguished minority leader, I know, has already been in communication with the President on this matter, and I, too, have discussed it with administration representatives, including the Secretary of State.

We will certainly want to have further discussions, to insure that the functions and responsibilities of Senate observers are as clearly delineated as possible. In that regard, and for the information of the Senate, I would like to include in the Record a letter which I received yesterday from Acting Secretary of State Ken Dam, which gives some initial thoughts on the State Department's perception of what role these observers might best play.

Finally, the resolution which I offer can be an important first manifestation of what I hope—what I plan—will be an on-going process to reestablish a bipartisan spirit in this body's consideration of vital national security and foreign policy issues. The distinguished minority leader and I have worked together on this resolution. Without his support and his substantive contributions, we could not hope to see its passage today. Without the support of the Democratic Members of this body, its passage would have far less meaning and impact.

I would also indicate we have cleared the resolution on this side with the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Goldwater, and with the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Lugar.

Rebuilding this spirit of bipartisanship will not be a quick or easy process. But it is a task we must undertake, and there is no issue more important on which to begin than the issue of nuclear arms control. There is no time better to begin than right now.

Mr. President, I have asked for the immediate consideration of this resolution and the support of all Senators for its immediate passage.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter to which I refer be made a part of the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, January 2, 1985.

Hon. ROBERT DOLE,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR DOLE: In the Secretary's absence, I would like to follow-up on our breakfast meeting and share some further thoughts with you regarding Senator Byrd's proposal for Senate observers on the negotiating team.

It would aid our efforts if, once formal negotiations are underway, the negotiating team and the Secretary could have available the advice of the Senate on a continuing basis. To this end, in addition to our normal consultations with the Congress, it would be useful if you and Senator Byrd could designate a small group of Senators with which to consult on a regular basis. We would keep this group fully informed on the status of the negotiations; they would also be welcome to meet with the delegations at the negotiations where they would be provided full briefings on the status of the negotiations. We will seek to have them meet with the Soviet delegates as well.

We will discuss this approach with the House Leadership and see if they are interested in forming a similar group.

The Secretary greatly appreciates your draft resolution that supports our efforts to seek meaningful reductions in nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union. It is our hope that in the near future the Soviet Union will be prepared to engage in serious negotiations.

I look forward to working closely with you in the new year.

Sincerely yours,

KENNETH W. DAM,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I am pleased to cosponsor and coauthor this resolution supporting the resumption of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union—negotiations which I hope will result in an agreement with the Soviet Union deserving of the approval of the Senate. I understand that the talks that will take place in Geneva on January 7 and 8 are preliminary, and are for the purpose of establishing an agenda and a structure for the resumption of formal negotiations in the near future. I am hopeful that these preliminary discussions between Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko will succeed in establishing such an agenda and structure.

I do not presume that the conclusion of responsible arms control agreements, particularly those which might provide for reductions in the military muscle of our Nation and of the Soviet State, will come quickly or easily. The Soviets are well known as tough negotiators, and this process will take some time. Nevertheless, we must negotiate, persistently and with creativity, to fully explore the possibilities for responsible agreements.

The Soviets are a brutal adversary. Since we inhabit the world together, and since each of the two superpowers possess the means to destroy the other with nuclear weaponry, agreements which serve our national interest, which reduce the risk of war and the misunderstandings which lead to war, which are fair, verifiable and clear, and which save the Nation money to be better spent elsewhere—these are worth our best efforts.

I am, therefore, pleased to join the distinguished Republican leader, Mr. Dole, in commending the commitment by the President to making arms control negotiations a high priority goal in his second term. I am pleased to extend the Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, my full support for his efforts to set the stage for the resumption of negotiations with the Soviets. I wish him every success.

Mr. President, any accord with the Soviet Union to restrict, control, or reduce our strategic weapons will carry considerable weight for our country. It will vitally affect our national security, and the security of all of our constituents. Such an agreement must be, I believe, supported by a substantial national consensus to stand the test of time. Such a consensus is best achieved through the traditional treatymaking process which has been followed in the field of strategic arms control agreements entered into by the United States. The role of the Senate is, of course, central to this process. In order for the Senate to be more informed on a regular basis about the progress of the negotiations which may take place, I suggested to the President by telephone on December 9, 1984, that a small, bipartisan group of Senators, to be appointed by the majority and minority leaders, be afforded observer status on our delegation to any arms control negotiations which may occur as a result of the Shultz-Gromyko meetings. I followed up this discussion with a letter to the President on December 11, 1984. As I stated in that letter, it should be of benefit to the knowledge and understanding of all Senators if access to the negotiating sessions were to be established on a regularized basis. In addition, I believe the informal reactions and views of Senators to any ongoing talks should be of real value to our negotiating team at a time before final decisions of specific issues are made.

The President's initial reaction to my suggestion was positive, and I am pleased that the distinguished Republican leader has joined with me in including a recommendation for observers in the resolution now before the Senate. I have discussed this proposal with a number of my colleagues on this side of the aisle as well as with Mr. Dole. I appreciate his remarks on the need for the Senate to work in bipartisan way on those issues which are of such national magnitude as this. On matters of foreign policy, and particularly superpower relations, we are stronger as a nation when we speak with one voice. Bipartisanship in foreign affairs, in our relations

with the rest of the world, has been a wise tradition for the United States—and I can assure my friend from Kansas that I will continue to make every effort to strengthen it in every possible instance. I am sure the specific details of the arrangements for a Senate observer group can be developed in a fashion satisfactory to both the administration and the Senate over the next several weeks.

I am pleased to join Mr. Dole in sponsoring this sense of the Senate resolution—as he has stated, it is fitting that this resolution be the first item on the agenda of the 99th Congress. There is a fresh promise for renewed efforts to control the nuclear arsenals of the two great powers, to build better safeguards against misunderstanding. I know I speak for my colleagues in wishing the Secretary of State the best in his discussions with Mr. Gromyko.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I will only add one additional word. I want to thank the distinguished minority leader for his strong support and for his suggestion, that we do have observers.

Mr. President, I would only say at this time I am certain we can define more precisely the role of the observers but it would be my thought, at least on this side of the aisle, that we are looking at Senators who have some experience in the area, and I think that one Senator, through no choice of his own, must leave the Intelligence Committee, Senator Wallop, of Wyoming.

Obviously, Mr. President, I would clear such appointments with the appropriate committee chairmen, but I have in mind such Senators as Senator Wallop and others who may serve on the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. President, it is an opportunity. I think in our private discussions we have talked about the need to make certain there is some outline, some specificity, on what the observers should or should not do.

Mr. President, I am very pleased that we have the resolution before the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate? If not, the question is on agreeing to the resolution.

The resolution (S. Res. 19), with its preamble, was agreed to.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Wilson). Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, DC, January 5, 1984.

Hon. ROBERT DOLE,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR DOLE: I am delighted to learn that you will be serving as an ex-officio member of the group of Senate arms control observers. Please accept my congratulations.

I welcome this step by the Senate, which I believe can facilitate and enhance our consultative process and help establish the kind

of unity which our nation needs as we approach this issue of such great importance.

We go to Geneva in a positive and constructive attitude. Our aim is to bring about a process of formal negotiations on offensive nuclear systems and defensive systems, including space-related issues. We go with no illusions, however. Should progress not prove possible now, we are fully confident that our position will become widely recognized as reasonable and creative. Whatever the immediate outcome at Geneva, the President's initiative already has provided an approach that inevitably will contribute to the goal of eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons.

I look forward to consulting with you at an early opportunity after my return from Geneva.

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE P. SHULTZ.

U.S. SENATE,
Washington, DC, January 9, 1985.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We would like to express our appreciation to you for your positive response to the recommendation that official observers from the Senate be included on our delegations to planned arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

As you know, we believe such observers will make a major contribution to the Senate's understanding of and support for any agreements which emerge from the negotiations growing out of Secretary Shultz's successful meetings in Geneva.

As we discussed in our meeting of Friday, January 4, we would like to recommend to you the following Senators, who are especially qualified to serve as the Senate's observers.

Chairman: Ted Stevens.

Co-Chairman: Sam Nunn.

Malcolm Wallop, Barry Goldwater, Richard G. Lugar, Don Nickles, Bob Dole, or his designee, ex officio.

Claiborne Pell, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Edward M. Kennedy, Albert Gore, Robert C. Byrd, or his designee, ex officio.

In conclusion, we would like to reiterate to you, Mr. President, the pledge which we, and all the Members of the Senate, implicity undertook in approving our January 3 arms control resolution: to work with you, on a bipartisan basis, in pursuit of workable, verifiable arms control agreements, which meet the interests of our national security and the interests of a more secure and peaceful world.

Sincerely,

BOB DOLE,
Majority Leader.
ROBERT C. BYRD,
Minority Leader.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, January 25, 1985.

Hon. SAM NUNN,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR NUNN: Following our conversation on January 17, I would like to outline my thoughts on how you, Senator Nunn, and the Senate liaison group can be most effective as consultants to the Executive Branch on the upcoming nuclear and space arms control negotiations.

Early in the development of the main elements of the United States positions regarding strategic, intermediate-range, and space and defensive arms, I intend to seek your counsel. Senior Administration officials will be available to you and Senator Nunn to discuss the basic issues and questions facing the Executive Branch. Similarly, as the negotiations progress, we will seek your advice when considering major changes to our positions.

You would thus have a sense of the various substantive issues before decisions are taken. As we all agree, the final decision on US positions of course remains the President's. Given the importance of protecting sensitive Executive Branch deliberations on these issues, discretion will be necessary.

We intend to keep you and other members of the liaison group fully informed as to what is happening in the actual negotiations. In Washington, we would plan regular and detailed briefings by senior Administration officials on the progress of the talks, and will also designate a member of my staff as a contact point to address specific questions as they arise. When the negotiations are in recess, we will schedule briefings by the negotiators themselves.

I encourage you and Senator Stevens to travel to the negotiating site when the talks are in session. When there, you and other members of the liaison group would be welcome to join in the internal delegation meetings, both before and after sessions with the Soviets. As I noted on Thursday, I believe we should set aside for now the question of participation in the formal plenary sessions. However, we will arrange opportunities for you to meet with the Soviet negotiators. Such informal sessions will allow you the opportunity to gain a full sense of the Soviet approach, and have traditionally been more conducive to a freer exchange of ideas.

As to the question of press contacts, I agree that it would be useful to publicize your presence at the negotiating site. However, we and the Soviets in the past agreed to minimize the amount of public commentary originating from the negotiating site; any comment should avoid the substance of the talks.

I believe the contacts outlined above will ensure the close involvement of the Senate consultants in the nuclear and space arms control negotiations. I personally look forward to your participation; not only will it allow us to keep the Senate fully informed of developments in the talks, but I believe your input into the process will help us to develop arms control positions that enjoy wide bipartisan support with the American people and in Congress.

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE P. SHULTZ.

U.S. SENATE,
OFFICE OF THE DEMOCRATIC LEADER,
Washington, DC, February 1, 1985.

Hon. GEORGE P. SHULTZ,
Secretary of State,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I understand that you are currently fashioning your concept of how the Senate Arms Control Observer Group should function in relation to the upcoming negotiations with the Soviet Union. As I mentioned to you and the President on several occasions, the advantages of a responsible arrangement will flow to both branches of government in the way of deeper mutual appreciation of the very important national issues involved in a new arms control agreement.

Senator Nunn, whom I have appointed as co-chairman of the Group, has informed me that you have agreed to include Senate Observers in the U.S. delegation briefing and debriefing sessions, and I believe that will be very useful. In addition, I urge that an arrangement be worked out for Senators to be given access to the plenary sessions. I understand the sensitivity that might arise from Senators being present at the negotiating sessions—certainly there is no intent on my part for Senators to be placed in any situation where they could be construed as participants in the negotiations.

I believe that access to the plenary sessions and to the briefing/debriefing sessions would suffice to satisfy the needs of the Senate.

I would appreciate your support on this matter and look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

ROBERT C. BYRD.

SENATE RESOLUTION 86—RELATING TO THE BIPARTISAN GROUP OF SENATORS ATTENDING THE ARMS REDUCTION OR CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. DOLE (for himself and Mr. BYRD) submitted the following resolution; which was considered and agreed to:

S. RES. 86

Resolved, that the bipartisan group of Senators designated pursuant to clause (5) of the first section of S. Res. 19, 99th Congress (agreed to January 3, 1985), to act as official observers on the United States delegation to formal arms reduction or control negotiations to which the United States is a party (which group shall hereinafter be referred to as the "Senate Observer Group") shall be headed by four Senators serving as Co-Chairmen: two from the Majority party, Ted Stevens of Alaska, and Richard Lugar of Indiana; and two from the Minority party, Sam Nunn of Georgia, and Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island.

SEC. 2. (a) The Senate Observer Group is authorized, from funds made available under section 3, to employ such staff (including consultants at a daily rate of pay) in the manner and at a rate not to exceed that allowed for employees of a standing committee of the

Senate under paragraph (3) of section 105(e) of the Legislative Branch Appropriation Act, 1968 (2 U.S.C. 61 1(e)), and incur such expenses as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out its duties and functions.

(b) Each Co-Chairman of the Senate Observer Group is authorized to designate a professional staff member. The designated Group staff shall also include, a secretary selected by, and responsible to, the Majority, and a secretary selected by, and responsible to, the Minority. The funds necessary to compensate any such staff member who is an employee of a Senator or of a Senate Committee, who has been designated to perform service for the Senate Observer Group, such staff member shall continue to be paid by such Senator or such Committee, as the case may be, but the account from which such staff member is paid shall be reimbursed for his services (including agency contributions when appropriate) out of funds made available under section 3(a) of this resolution. The four professional staff members, authorized by this subsection, shall serve all of the members of the Senate Observer Group, and carry out such other functions as their respective Co-Chairmen may specify.

(c). The Majority Leaders may each designate one staff member to serve the Observer Group. Funds necessary to compensate leadership staff shall be transferred from the funds made available under section 3(b) of this Resolution to the respective account from which such designated staff member is paid.

SEC. 3. (a). The expenses of the Senate Observer Group shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate, out of the account of Miscellaneous Items, upon vouchers approved by Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska, Chairman for Administrative purposes (except that vouchers shall not be required for the disbursement of salaries of employees who are paid at an annual rate). For any fiscal year, not more than $500,000 shall be expended for staff (including consultants) and for expenses (excepting expenses incurred for foreign travel).

(b). In addition to the amount referred to in Sec. 3(a), for any fiscal year, not more than $150,000 shall be expended from the contingent fund of the Senate, out of the account for Miscellaneous Items, for Leadership staff as designated in Section 2(c) for salaries and expenses (excepting expenses incurred for foreign travel).

(c).(1). Of the amount authorized in Section 3(a), an amount not to exceed $50,000 may be spent by the Senate Observer Group, with the prior approval of the Committee on Rules and Administration, to procure the temporary services (not in excess of one year) or intermittent services of individual consultants, or organizations thereof, to make studies or advise the Senate Observer Group.

(2). Such services in the cases of individuals or organizations may be procured by contract as independent contractors, or in the case of individuals by employment at daily rates of compensation not in excess of the rate of compensation which may be paid to a regular employee of a standing committee of the Senate. Such contracts shall not be subject to the provisions of section 3709 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 5) or any other provisions of law requiring advertising.

(3). Any such consultant shall be selected by Senator Stevens and Senator Nunn, acting jointly. The Senate Observer Group shall submit to the Committee on Rules and Administration information bearing on the qualifications of each consultant whose services are procured pursuant to this subsection, including organizations, and such information shall be retained by the Senate Observer Group and shall be made available for public inspection upon request.

SENATE ARMS CONTROL OBSERVERS HAIL START OF NEW TALKS

GENEVA.—The U.S. Senate Arms Control Observers Group today hailed the beginning of the new U.S.-Soviet negotiations on nuclear and space arms as "an important first step on a road we hope will lead to a more stable and secure strategic balance." Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole and Senate Minority Leader Robert C. Byrd, as ex officio members, led the observer group to the opening of the talks.

The Senate passed a resolution introduced by the two Senate leaders on January 3, 1985, establishing the group. Co-chairmen of the group are Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), and Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI). Other members include: Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-WY) [7], Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) [7], Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), Senator Albert Gore (D-TN), Senator John Warner (R-VA), and Senator Don Nickles (R-OK).

In accordance with the Senate's constitutional role to advise and consent, the group will help keep the Senate informed of the progress of the negotiations and respond to requests by the administration for advice on the conduct of the negotiations. The Senators will not function as negotiators.

Secretary of State Shultz wrote to the group on January 5, 1985: "I welcome this step by the Senate, which I believe can facilitate and enhance our consultative process and help establish the kind of unity which our nation needs as we approach this issue of such great importance."

In addition, Secretary Shultz has expressed the view that the group's input into the process will help the administration develop arms control positions that will enjoy wide bipartisan support with the American people and the Congress.

At a press conference held at the International Conference Center, the group stated its long-term objective: "to avoid a recurrence of the problems of the 1970's, when three successive arms control treaties, signed by three different presidents, were never approved for ratification by the Senate."

The Senators pledged to fulfill their responsibilities as official observers on the U.S. Delegation "on the basis of the national interest of the United States without regard for partisan consideration."

The group commended the President for his commitment to make arms control one of the highest priority goals of his second administration and urged him to conduct these talks "with creativ-

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[7] (Senators Wallop and Moynihan will not be attending this preliminary session, but will be attending subsequent negotiations.)

ity and flexibility consistent with the security requirements of the United States and its friends and allies."

A copy of the joint statement is attached.

JOINT STATEMENT: U.S. SENATE ARMS CONTROL OBSERVERS GROUP

As the new negotiations on nuclear and space arms open today here in Geneva, we believe that the United States and the Soviet Union are taking an important first step on a road we hope will lead to a more stable and secure strategic balance. We recognize that these negotiations will be enormously complex and difficult, and that great patience will be required on the part of the two Governments and their publics. As officially-designated Observers on the U.S. Delegation, we are prepared to assist in this process for as long as it takes to achieve an equitable and verifiable agreement that enhances our national security and lessens the risk of nuclear confrontation.

As noted in a resolution introduced by Senators Dole and Byrd and passed unanimously by the Senate on January 3, we commend President Reagan for his commitment to make arms control one of the highest priorities of his second term of office and urge him to approach these talks with creativity and flexibility consistent with the security requirements of the United States and its friends and allies. If the negotiations are to succeed, it is equally important that the Soviet Union engage in good faith bargaining in a genuine effort to find a common ground that promotes both sides' security interests.

At the outset of these negotiations, we want to emphasize our concern over Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements and understandings. Discussion of compliance issues is properly conducted in the U.S./Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) or, if required, through high-level diplomatic channels. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union must understand that if it genuinely wants these new talks to produce an agreement that can be ratified and entered into force, it must be far more forthcoming in responding to U.S. demarches on the violations issue and in halting prohibited strategic activities.

As Observers on the U.S. Delegation, we intend to discharge our responsibilities on the basis of the national interest of the United States without regard for partisan considerations. We look forward to remaining closely involved in the negotiations and stand ready to offer such counsel to the administration as may be useful when major changes are being considered in U.S. negotiating positions. Our long-term objective is to avoid a recurrence of the problems of the 1970s, when three successive arms control treaties, signed by three presidents, were never approved for ratification by the Senate.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUB: TRANSCRIPT OF SENATE CODEL PRESS CONFERENCE ON ARMS TALKS

Following is full and corrected transcript of Senate codel's press conference in Geneva, March 12 on the re-opening of arms talks. (Begin transcript)

Senator DOLE. Let me indicate, for the entire group, that we believe we have an important role to play in these negotiations that are in progress as we sit here.

We have had a number of meetings with our negotiators. We're here as a result of a resolution passed on January 3 in the Congress, suggested by my colleague on the left, Senator Byrd, the minority leader. We have each designated five observers, so we have a total of one dozen Capitol leaders, and ten of that twelve are here today—Senator Wallop and Senator Moynihan could not be here.

But I would indicate in a brief statement that this is a very serious business. We are very hopeful that yesterday's change in the Soviet leadership may have some impact, but that has yet to be verified. It is significant that the negotiations did proceed this morning. We will be monitoring the discussions, the negotiations—I would say on a continuous basis over the next several weeks or however long it may take.

What we would like to this morning—having made that brief statement, I would ask Senator Byrd, minority leader of the Senate, to make a statement. Then we would yield—the two leaders will yield to our co-chairmen Senator Stevens and Senator Nunn, followed by Senator Lugar and Senator Pell. So I think perhaps if we could sort of play musical chairs here, and we will obviously then accept questions.

Senator BYRD. We also have a prepared statement which is available; I assume you have the prepared text.

We have met with our negotiating team. We think they are ready. They are upbeat; they are optimistic. They are prepared to be firm, and they are prepared to say "no" or "yes"—whatever may be appropriate in the interest of our country.

I would hope that the leadership of the Soviet Union, having made the transition in a very slick and orderly manner, would allow the negotiators on the Soviet side to be more flexible and to accommodate themselves to some of our proposals.

This group of observers will be the eyes and ears of the United States Senate, which has a very special role under the Constitution in connection with the approval of treaties. They will be here from time to time, and they will be in a position to offer advice and counsel to our negotiating team if it is the desire of the team to have such advice and counsel. We are not here to negotiate arms control. But if a treaty should emerge after a while or if interim treaties were agreed, we in the Senate would need to have more than just a cursory knowledge of the content and the background of the agreements.

We hope that there will be some interim agreements. We accept that a single agreement is difficult and takes a long time. I think our negotiators are prepared to say "no" and walk away from a bad agreement. We are all Americans, we all want the same thing.

We all want an agreement, but we don't want an agreement that is not in the best interests of our country.

So these members of the observer team will be there to offer advice and come back to us and keep us informed of the proceedings.

It is going to be a very difficult and time-consuming event, we think, and any agreement's going to get very sound advice, especially as we're going to deal with the technologies of the era in which we now live.

So we're happy to be here today, and very pleased with the people we've visited with. As the majority leader Mr. Dole has indicated, we have with us Senators who are very experienced in these things, and in dealing with strategic weapons, intermediate-range weapons, space technologies, and so on. So I'm going to hand over here to Senator Stevens and the others.

Senator STEVENS. I am very delighted to be here also, and to have an opportunity to participate in observing the talks as they go on.

Senator Vandenberg, a great American Senator, used to say that if the Senate was going to be required to be on board at the time of any potential crash landings, we ought to be on board for the takeoff. And that's what we've done—not that we're participating in any prediction of a crash landing, but we believe we will function much better in our constitutional sense if we're here now and we have a presence here as much as possible during the whole period of negotiations.

I am particularly concerned to convey to the negotiators the great interest of the United States Senate in the allegations of past violations on the part of the Soviet Union, and to make certain that the scope of these negotiations take into account what I consider the great concern on the part of the American people that any new agreement entered into be cognizant of the impact of those past negotiations in terms of our future relationship. And Senator Nunn, as the co-chairman, has remarked often about the fact that there have been three agreements negotiated with the Soviets that have not been approved by process. I don't want to steal his thunder so I'll yield to Sam on that.

Senator NUNN. I don't have a lot to add to what Senators Dole and Byrd and Stevens have said. As a matter of history, we have had three treaties entered into by three different Presidents—two Republicans and one Democrat—over the last 12 years that have never been ratified by the United States Senate. So I think the record speaks for itself in terms of the need for the Senate to be involved in the takeoff, as Senator Stevens said, and that's why we're here.

I think this is a historic occasion without any doubt. We have a unique opportunity to strive together—the Soviet Union and the United States—towards a more stable world, a more stable nuclear balance, and begin down the road to that end.

I think it's also certainly going to be, without any doubt, one of the most difficult and complex negotiations that the two countries have ever endeavored to seek agreement on. We have three baskets—we have intermediate forces; we have strategic forces; and

we have also discussions of space and space weapons, and ground-based weapons that can go in space.

Now, that has a good side and a difficult side. The good side is that those three baskets allow the negotiations, at some point, when they get further down the road, to begin to look at the interplay between the various components. Certainly, there's a connection between offense and defense. Certainly, there are difficult gray areas between intermediate forces and strategic forces.

On the other side of it, it makes it much more difficult and complex than any set of negotiations we've had. Salt-I took about three and a half years to complete. Salt-II took about six years to complete. We have to look at the record of history, and we have to look at that in terms of approaching these negotiations with patience—that's important from the point of view of both sides.

We have urged our negotiators—we have met with them and we expressed a bipartisan confidence in our negotiators; we have an excellent team here; we have excellent people back in Washington that are looking very closely at these (talks)—we have urged our negotiators, and I am sure they will, and I would hope their Soviet counterparts will do likewise, to approach these negotiations in a constructive attitude, with creativity and flexibility. And it's going to require a lot of creativity and flexibility on both sides to reach agreement in this difficult area.

So as a member of this observer team, I'm grateful to Senator Byrd and Senator Dole for the leadership they've taken in what I think is a very, very important step in having the Senate of the United States participate in this process—not as negotiators, but as observers.

I also want to underscore, in a bipartisan fashion, what Senator Stevens said about the alleged Soviet violations. Those give us a great deal of concern—not just Republicans but Republicans and Democrats alike. And one of the things that's most on the mind of the American people as we go into these negotiations is whether we can really have meaningful agreements unless we have confidence those agreements are being carried out.

So I would hope that that point could be underscored here in Geneva, and I would hope that not only our negotiators but the standing consultative commission would address those at an early stage, and the sooner we clarify those allegations as well as ambiguities, the better I think the negotiations will go.

Senator DOLE. Senator Lugar is chairman of our Foreign Relations Committee and he and Senator Pell are also co-chairmen of this group.

Senator LUGAR. We're pleased to join Senator Dole and Senator Byrd, Senator Stevens and Senator Nunn in making these comments this morning. I would like to point out that the United States of America is committed to the security of our country and we're confident that our Soviet counterparts are likewise committed. Arms control can be a part of that security. It is not a substitute for that security, but I think that's an important distinction to make at the outset—that occasional euphoria over arms control becomes in fact a substitute for the discussion of what is needed to make certain that the power is secure.

Having said that, the arms control talks offer an excellent opportunity, not only for negotiations in a bilateral sense, but for discussion between the two powers as to how security might be enhanced. Clearly, the United States will offer, in discussion of the strategic defense initiative, an idea as to how the deterrent power of our country and the Soviet Union might lead to greater security for both of these powers, and for the world in general.

It's a complex idea, and it may take some time to discuss and to understand comprehensively, but it's an extremely important initiative as are the pick-up of talks in both of the other two areas, where substantial progress has been made in the past.

Let me add just one further thought, and that is that questions that were raised yesterday at the time of the death of Mr. Chernenko, as to whether the talks would even continue, are indicative of how much our bilateral relationship has come to rest on arms control alone. I suspect that we are very hopeful as a delegation, as are our negotiators, that bilateral relations just might extend into many other realms, and that the Soviet-American relationship might become much more substantial in a general political way. Because those ties are absolute in the sense that it is necessary whether there are transitions in leadership, or ups and downs and reverses that might occur in the arms control situation, the continuity of the relationship, the ability to get back together into conversation, is of the essence.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much. I think there is a great deal of optimism, some of it misplaced, since the remaining differences are still profound between the two sides. I doubt if anything brand-new will waive instructions that have been given to either side, from when they last sat together. I think that we'll have to look ahead and recognize that the outline of whatever agreement comes will probably include a reduction in Soviet strategic missiles—the heavy missiles—and Soviet controls on our space weapons.

That will take quite a while to go down that path and get there, and in order to do it it's going to mean a reduction in inflammatory rhetoric; it is going to mean that the negotiations will have to be done in private, and not with the press; and also I really believe that the political leadership of each country may well be involved before we're through in trying to break through the large gap.

Finally, the death of Mr. Chernenko I think will have very little effect on the general course of Soviet policy. You must remember that in the last 28 months there have been four changes in leadership in the Soviet Union, and that has not affected one whit of their general policy and their movement in these arms control talks, because of the collective leadership that is theirs, where one man can die, and the policy remains very much the same.

Senator DOLE. If you'll just bear with us, I'd like to hear now from Senators Kennedy and Warner, both members of the Armed Services Committee, and then Senator Gore and Senator Nickles—Senator Gore, recognized expert on arms control, Senator Nickles, who made this a matter of great importance, and then we'll respond to questions, at least Senator Stevens and I.

Senator WARNER. During the course of these negotiations, it's my expectation that the negotiators will find the opportunity to have more and more confidence-building measures discussed, and per-

haps be a bipartisan of these negotiations. Senator Nunn and I are instrumental in the Senate in introducing resolutions last year calling for the improvement on the hot line, and indeed that did take place and the technical equipment utilized by the Soviets and the United States is in the process of being upgraded at this time, and I anticipate that this forum will provide for other confidence-building measures.

Senator KENNEDY. I don't think there's any question but that the eyes of the world are focused on Geneva today. No decision made by this administration or during this decade is going to be more important than the decisions which are going to be made here in Geneva over the period of the next months and the next few years, both with regards to the security of the United States and to the cause of peace throughout the world.

I can remember the sense of satisfaction that President Kennedy had after the signing of the partial test-ban treaty, after an extremely difficult time with the Soviet Union following the Cuban missile crisis.

I think all of us are mindful that these past months and past years have also been a time of challenge between the United States and the Soviet Union. But I think that all of us here recognize that with a positive outcome from these negotiations, that this truly can be an opening—an opportunity, rather—for a century of peace. And I think all of us here welcome the opportunity to serve with Senator Dole and Senator Byrd and to be a part of this process—not as negotiators but as observers—and to help insure that the Senate of the United States will be a meaningful part of the final outcome of these negotiations.

Senator NICKLES. Just briefly, I can say that for any arms negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union to be successful, it's going to take a commitment. It's certainly going to take a commitment from the United States, and from the administration and also from the United States Senate. And I can tell you that the commitment is there; this administration is committed to get an actual agreement for arms reduction. I can tell you also that the United States Senate would like to see an agreement for arms reduction. Also a commitment from the Soviet Union looks very promising. The very fact that they're negotiating today, with Mr. Chernenko's death, I think is very promising. There seems to be a real commitment there, and their return to the bargaining table I think is very promising, and I hope and pray that there will be a successful outcome.

We are interested in a treaty that will help reduce arms, a treaty that we can actually have confidence that there will be some compliance in, and also one that we can have some confidence that the verification of the means, that the treaty will actually be lived up to by both sides, and the net result be a world in which we reduce the amount of nuclear tensions, reduce the tensions and the fear and anxieties that people have throughout the world. A treaty that we can all be happy with, and one that will increase the peace and security throughout the world.

Senator GORE. I know you're anxious to go to questions, so I'll be very brief. I think those of you who are here covering these talks will quickly find out two things, if you haven't already.

Number one is, this is perhaps the most capable team of negotiators that the United States has ever put into the field. There's an excellent chemistry among the people working on the delegation. They are very capable, they're going to do a good job on behalf of the United States and in fulfilling their responsibility to the world to help move these talks toward a successful conclusion.

Secondly, you will find that these talks are without a doubt the most complex and difficult that the United States has every attempted.

Therefore, the need for patience is great, and back in the United States you will find strong bipartisan support for the negotiating team. We've met with them extensively, we're looking forward to meeting with them again this afternoon, and we've been very impressed with them. All of us are very hopeful, and as we go back to the United States at the end of this week—some of us tomorrow—we'll take back a message of hope and optimism.

QUESTION. Can you tell us a little bit more about how your observer team will function? You say you will consult and provide advice to the negotiating team. Will you actually sit in on any sessions or will you be briefed outside of the sessions? How will you manage the observer role?

Senator STEVENS. We anticipate sitting in on the briefing before the sessions start on Tuesdays and Thursdays and the other days that they negotiate, and them in on the de-briefings. As the talks develop, we'll see whether we want to actually sit in during the negotiations. At the beginning, these negotiations are very sensitive; having an additional one or two people in the room might be destabilizing; we will not insist on that yet, and we'll let that work out.

QUESTION. How much interplay do you expect there will be between the observer group and the negotiators, and what impact will that have on the course of the negotiations?

Senator STEVENS. Well, I hope that it is a very salutary impact. We believe in a two-way street as far as these negotiators are concerned. We are expected to observe and take back to Washington, as we come and go from Washington, impressions of the progress of these negotiations. And we also intend to communicate to them the comments that are made to us by the leadership and other Members of the Senate.

We have a very close relationship with the negotiators and anticipate that we will be able to at least convey to them the concerns of the Senate so that we can in fact be part of the whole process. We will not be negotiators ourselves.

QUESTION. You have all discussed the bipartisan character of your approach to these talks. But have you decided on the role of SDI in the negotiations? Is there a bipartisan approach on that? And specifically for Senator Nunn, who deals with North Atlantic Parliamentarians—do you think there will be allied unity on SDI?

Senator STEVENS. Let me comment first, and then Sam will answer the question that you directed to him.

The whole scope of these negotiations is under the control of our executive branch. The Senate would have to pass on the end product, and we are trying to have contact throughout the period of these negotiations to ensure our complete understanding of the process and how it develops.

I don't believe that it is within our province to say whether SDI or any other element of these talks should or should not be pursued and when it should be pursued in the talks. I do believe that we will make comments as we go along concerning the progress and the emphasis, and the negotiators take that into account as they conduct the negotiations on behalf of the executive branch.

We have a real tradition in our country that politics stops at the water's edge. I can think of no instance when that should be more important than in a consideration such as the arms control negotiations—looking for radical reductions in nuclear arms—and this is a bipartisan group: it is a non-partisan group in terms of our approach to the subject.

Senator NUNN. I will just add that I think there are some areas of rather substantial agreement in the whole SDI area, and there are some areas that could still be considered within the administration and by the Congress. We are going to inevitably have disagreements on the details; we will have some disagreements, perhaps, as to definition and concept of where the business will lead. And certainly we'll have, as any democracy will, disagreements about the role of defenses in the arms control talks.

But I think it is important to underscore that there is a very broad consensus on both sides of the aisle, Democrats and Republicans throughout the country, that research is absolutely legitimate. Research is legitimate under the ABM Treaty. President Reagan has said that we intend to abide by the ABM Treaty. He has stated that we will, as provided for in the treaty, give notice of any change in direction that we have plans to do. There is also a broad kind of consensus in our country that the treaty as it is now written must be complied with.

I think that Democrats and Republicans are very concerned about the allegations concerning the Soviet radar in central Siberia. If we are going to really discuss in a meaningful way on arms control—the ABM Treaty and the way it is going in the future—it seems to me a condition precedent to that would be to make sure that both sides are complying with it now.

So there is a broad consensus about research; there is a broad consensus about the allegations of Soviet violations; and I think that the other parts will have to be sorted out as we go along. There is an awful lot that can be discussed here. In addition to the ABM Treaty violations that we now believe are occurring, both sides are going to have to decide where research ends and where development begins. Both sides are going to have to have a better definition of what the word "component" means, because a component part of that kind of defense is barred by the ABM Treaty. And both sides are going to have to have a better understanding of what "platform" is, so there is an awful lot for both sides to discuss in the ABM Treaty, and I hope it will be done in a constructive way on both sides.

Senator LUGAR. Let me just make a comment about the importance of the question dealing with the alliance. It is of the essence that our negotiators continue to work with all of the strong allies of the United States to make certain there is full understanding of our negotiating position. Now, it's especially important, I think, in the SDI, because this is a relatively new idea in arms control, one

on which there has been some skepticism in our country, quite apart from questions raised in other countries. But in general it seems to be important to say that at the outset we are hopeful that our allies will be willing to listen carefully and to consult with us, to entertain new ideas, and to think of all that this situation involves, because there is a high degree, it seems to me, of dedication involved in these talks as they begin.

QUESTION. Have you folks heard anything here to affect your votes next week on the MX issue?

Senator STEVENS. Well, I haven't. I was a firm believer in the MX before I came. As you know, we've spent 13 billion dollars on that system so far. We will vote this next week on whether or not we should release the one and a half billion dollars which was made available last year for the next 21 MX missiles, and after that we will have just about six billion left on a 20-billion-dollar system.

In my judgment, just from the point of view of the expenditures we've made to date, it is essential that we modernize that missile force. It will literally cost us more to keep the old one going than it would be to finish this one. And I think that with the Russians having already deployed three or four systems of a similar character, that the continued deployment of the MX should not affect these talks one way or another.

QUESTION. There was some talk that you were coming over here to see how sincere and earnest this arms control effort was, and that your impression might affect how you vote or what you recommend to the other members.

Senator NUNN. I think I can say that I believe that our negotiators and the President of the United States are proceeding in good faith. The question of good faith is subjective. I have never set that up as a criterion in any way for my own vote on this particular weapons system. I judge a weapons system on whether it is a system that will enhance the national security of the United States. If it does, then it seems to me that it is worthwhile. If it does not, or if it is not a priority, and there are others that are higher priorities, then I will take a look at it in that respect. I didn't come to Geneva to learn about the MX missile, and I won't go home with any different views than I did when I arrived.

QUESTION. I want to address a question to Senator Kennedy. You know, the Secretary-General said yesterday in Moscow that the Soviet delegation will propose a nuclear freeze at the negotiations. Can you develop your ideas about the negotiations, about the freeze—the nuclear freeze between the Soviet Union and the United States?

Senator KENNEDY. I introduced, with Senator Hatfield, a nuclear-freeze proposal four years ago, and we received on the vote, involving tabling that particular proposal, some 40 votes in the United States Senate, bipartisan in nature. That particular proposal is not a part of this negotiating process. The proposals now being advanced by this administration have been outlined during the course of these negotiations. I am, at this time, as an observer for the Senate, supporting those efforts by the executive and by the negotiating team.

Let me emphasize that, should there be an agreement, the first result would be a freeze at reduced levels. I don't think there is really a disagreement on the objective for a freeze, but the timing of the freeze.

QUESTION. Do you think one of the first priorities is to overcome Soviet insistence on linkage among the three sets of negotiations—that is, if progress could be reached on INF before space, should that proceed, or would there be a whole package deal?

Senator STEVENS. From my point of view, it is not our prerogative to set priorities for the negotiators. We have full confidence in them. I don't think I have been as impressed by an individual in my life as I am by Kampelman; he really has this whole subject in total perspective, and I haven't found one member here that has had any disagreeable word or really any disagreement with Max so far.

The priorities are for him to establish as to what goes forward first.

QUESTION. I want to ask Senator Nunn: On the issue of compliance, could you tell us your understanding about the Krasnoyarsk radar. Do you agree with the adminstration that it is an unambiguous violation of an existing agreement? Do you see any ambiguities?

Senator NUNN. I agree with the administration's position on it. I think the Soviets owe us an explanation as parties to a treaty where, by all the evidence we have, it seems to be an unambiguous violation of the treaties. So I agree with the administration on that. I think we ought to give the Soviet Union a chance to respond in a proper forum. We now have two proper forums, one is the standing consultative commission, and any technical details will have to be worked out there. But in terms of a political forum, that subject has to come up in the context of these discussions on the whole ABM treaty.

I think one of the ways the Soviets could most readily present a good solid foundation from now on as they proceed—the talks—is to clear up the use of that radar and to clear up what they are going to do with it; and if it is indeed, as we interpret it, a violation, to take steps to correct the violation.

Senator GORE. There is no member of the U.S. Senate who has looked at the evidence surrounding the radar on Krasnoyarsk who has not come away with the same conclusion; and that is that when it is turned on, it will be a clear violation of the ABM treaty. As a result, the Soviet Union is in an almost untenable position when it attempts to argue for a strengthening of the logic behind the ABM treaty, while proceeding toward a brazen violation of that treaty. The single most important thing the Soviet Union could do to move these talks forward toward a successful conclusion is to dismantle that radar at Krasnoyarsk.

QUESTION. The negotiation team went to Brussels to inform the NATO partners. Do you have any plans to do likewise or do you consider your task as a purely national one?

Senator NUNN. We are not going there now, and many of us are members of the NATO parliamentary conference and will be there in June—anyway, later this year. But we do meet with our counterparts in parliamentary systems in the free world and will main-

tain our contact with them. This observer group, however, was not given that responsibility. We have that in our individual capacities as Members of the Senate.

QUESTION. Senator Nunn, you spoke of history a short time ago. In a political sense, why do arms control treaties fail? And what do you propose to do to prevent that from happening again?

Senator NUNN. If I had a proposal to keep arms control from failing, I would probably be the head of the negotiating team rather than a Member of the United States Senate. I don't think anyone has that kind of magic formula and I don't pretend to, but I think the arms control treaties in the past have left too much in the way of ambiguity. I think in the past we have not had as clear goals in arms control on either side as we perhaps do now. I think both sides are now becoming more and more aware of the mutual interest we have in restraining nuclear weapons and the liberation of nuclear weapons in the world, in trying to build confidence-building measures; and in restraining our own nuclear arsenals.

So I believe the goals now are much clearer. For instance, it was for a long time considered a move toward more security to have a MIRV-type movement in our ballistic missiles, both submarine-launched and land-based ballistic missiles. I think from our point of view, we now believe that MIRVing and having fewer targets in terms of ratio with the number of warheads on both sides is a destabilizing move. We hope that we can convince the Soviets of that.

So if we both can agree on what stability encompasses and move in that direction, I think for the first time we will have clear goals. And in the past, as I read history, neither side has had a clear and explicit understanding of the goals.

Now that may be one of the most difficult concepts—to determine what we both can agree on in terms of stability. Certainly, that is going to be one of the most difficult areas in terms of the SDI—the relationship between offense and defense.

When we entered into the ABM Treaty in about 1971, one of the implicit understandings there, was that we were not going to have defenses on either side. We had to reduce the offensive threat, and instead offense has increased. So if the Soviet Union really wants to do something about America's strategic defense initiative, in addition to correcting the violations that we have already alluded to, they could certainly take a strong step in that direction by reducing significantly their first-strike potential, that is, their SS–18's and their SS–19's. So I believe we have much clearer goals as to where we are going and I hope we can reach some essential agreements with the Soviets on that.

QUESTION. Senator, I also meant to follow up—when I spoke about political failure, I meant the role of the Senate that you spoke of earlier. You spoke of failures in the past, in the Senate and you talked about what you might do this time, briefly, to prevent that.

Senator NUNN. Well, yes, I think the effort here is to have the Senate fulfill both halves of its constitutional responsibilities, not only the consent half—that's what we've been looking to primarily in the past—but also the advise half. And its up to the administration to say how much advice they want. We're not going to run around and knock on their door every day and say, "We're here to

advise you," but we are giving the administration the opportunity to solicit our views, not only on the substance from time to time, if they so desire, but also on the political situation within the Senate and what the Senators will be looking to on ratification. So we hope that this kind of coordination will first of all produce a treaty that we can all support, and second, will enable our country to have the kind of patience and tenacity, and yet creativity and flexibility we need at the negotiating table.

QUESTION. Senator Nunn and anyone else who would care to respond to it: You visited the Soviet mission this morning. I would be interested in your appreciation of the Soviet mood entering the talks, if you were able to gauge it, and do you think that your involvement in the talks will make them more forthcoming, since they will know that the probability of the results being rejected by the Senate has diminished?

Senator NUNN. I didn't get the last half of that question, I'm sorry.

QUESTION. Do you think that their forthcomingness in these talks will be increased by your presence here, since they will know that the treaty will have a greater chance of passing through the Senate as a result?

Senator NUNN. Well, I don't believe one trip will accomplish that latter purpose, but I think over a period of time as we continue to be a part of this process, that certainly the Soviets will be aware of that, and I would hope that they would perceive from that, that we do have a united country, that we're moving in one direction, and that if they do enter into agreement, that it has a much better chance of ratification than in the past, because the Senate is involved in that process.

I must say that all of us reserve the right to decide in our own respective capacities as to whether we will vote for ratification if a treaty is produced, but I think the process itself is being enhanced.

As to Chernenko's passing, first of all, our delegation expressed condolences last evening to the family of Chernenko and also to the Soviet people. I think we're all aware here that he was the leader of the Soviet people. I think we're all aware here that he was the leader of the Soviet Union when the Soviet Union decided to come back to the negotiating table. We are very well aware of that, and we think his place in history will certainly be improved and enhanced as we go forward with this process, if both sides can reach an agreement.

Second, I think that it has already been alluded to by my colleagues here: The fact that the Soviets are continuing this negotiation in a period of difficulty for them and a period of sadness for them in terms of the passing of their leader, I think indicates their seriousness of purpose here. We take that as a very positive and constructive sign.

Senator STEVENS. Let me just comment on one thing about Gorbachev's becoming the youngest leader of the Soviet Union in recent history was predicted to us by our intelligence forces some time ago, and including those from our allies.

I think we welcome the fact that the Soviet Union has a leader now who has the potential to be on the scene for a substantial period of time. These talks may take a substantial period of time,

and its a very, I think, good omen for the talks that he will have the chance to be there and to know that he will be there following the successful conclusion of these talks, if we get an agreement. As for the ratification, I think that Senator Lugar who's chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee ought to talk about that. Our role as observers does not go to the point of guiding any potential agreement through the Senate; that's Senator Lugar's and Senator Pell's.

Senator LUGAR. Well, my only comment can be that the observer group is tremendously important in forming a consensus of which ratification might occur. We do not know how many years the process may take or whether interim agreements might occur that would require hearing by the Foreign Relations Committee, and activity by the Senate, but the vigorous participation of all of our colleagues presently, I believe is of the essence in informing all Senators—for that matter—the American public, which ultimately will have to be behind a treaty to make certain that members vote in favor of it.

Senator DOLE. Senator Pell, do you want to make a comment on this before we depart?

Senator PELL. Having seen the failure of SALT II, I realize—we all realize—the importance of having a favorable breeze behind this treaty before it goes to the Senate. And this is where the observer's role plays an important part. It is the favorable breeze that will guide our chairman, Senator Lugar, in guiding the treaty through. The experience we've had, and the reports that we've brought back to our colleagues, will I believe play a very real role in the final ratification.

Senator DOLE. Thank you very much.

U.S. SENATE,
Washington, DC, March 13, 1985.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As you know, pursuant to Senate Resolution 19 of January 3, 1985, we have established a Senate Arms Control Observer Group of twelve members, with Senators Stevens, Nunn, Lugar and Pell as Co-Chairmen. All of the members we have designated to serve on the Group are exceedingly well qualified to consider arms control issues and are eager to make a significant and constructive contribution to the arms control process.

As a first major step in that direction, we led a delegation of ten members of the Group to Geneva March 9–13, to observe the opening of arms control talks with the Soviet Union. Those talks are likely to continue for many months and years, and members of the Observer Group will travel to Geneva periodically to monitor their progress. We think it useful, however, to convey to you our initial impressions of the events we observed and the discussions we held in Geneva.

We went to Geneva with two main goals, and we believe we accomplished both.

First, we wished to demonstrate conclusively that the Administration's arms control efforts enjoy the broad, bipartisan support of the Senate. Our presence in Geneva—five Republicans and five Democrats—was visible evidence of that unity. In public statements, in encounters with the media and in our private sessions with our negotiating team, we stressed our wish for a good agreement and our determination to be as patient and persevering as necessary to achieve one.

We are confident that our message was understood and that our presence strengthened the position of our team as it began its talks with the Soviet negotiators.

Second, we sought to demonstrate the seriousness with which the Senate intends to fulfill its Constitutionally-mandated role in the arms control process. While we made it clear that we do not go to Geneva as negotiators, we do go with two important missions: to consult with and advise our negotiating team and to monitor and report to the Senate on the progress and development of the talks.

We had several opportunities to meet with our negotiators before the commencement of talks, and we had a useful debriefing from them immediately after the conclusion of the first negotiating session. Each of the sessions with the negotiating team was structured to permit us the full opportunity to present our views and questions to the team and to engage in a candid and confidential exchange of information. Within the coming days, we will be presenting our observations to the Senate. Through this continuing process of monitoring the negotiations as they unfold, we are confident that the Senate will be in a much better position to consider any resulting treaty or agreement.

Finally, Mr. President, we would be remiss if we did not apprise you of the very positive impression which the negotiating team made on us during our stay in Geneva. Max Kampelman, John Tower, Mike Glitman and their deputies did a great job with us and are obviously doing a great job in preparing for, and conducting, the talks with the Soviet delegation. They are a credit to you, to your Administration and to the country they are serving so well.

Sincerely yours,

BOB DOLE,
Majority Leader.
ROBERT C. BYRD,
Minority Leader.

ARMS CONTROL OBSERVER GROUP TRIP TO GENEVA

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I returned yesterday from Geneva, where the distinguished minority leader and I led a delegation of 10 Members of the Senate's observer group to monitor the opening of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. I want to briefly offer the Senate at this point some observations on why we went to Geneva and what we accomplished there.

As the Senate knows, the arms control observer group was formed pursuant to Senate Resolution 19, passed unanimously on January 3.

This resolution's establishment of the observer group came about because of the leadership of the distinguished minority leader, Senator Robert Byrd. Senator Byrd should be commended by the body for his providing the initial inspiration for the arms control observer effort and for his tireless work to bring this group together as a functioning entity.

Its main purpose is to assist the Senate in carrying out its role under the Constitution to give advice and consent to the ratification of treaties, including any future arms control treaty.

In consideration of the importance and complexity of arms control issues, the distinguished minority leader and I took great care to recommend for inclusion on the Senate observer group some of the most distinguished Members of this body, who possessed long experience and special knowledge of those issues. As a result, we have a group which does great credit to the Senate and which has the knowledge and enthusiasm to perform its role effectively.

The group, as the Senators know, has four cochairmen: Senators Stevens, Nunn, Lugar, and Pell. The other Members are Senators Warner, Kennedy, Wallop, Moynihan, Nickles, and Gore. The distinguished minority leader serves with me as an ex officio member of the group. All of these observers, except Senators Wallop and Moynihan, were able to make this first trip to Geneva and the absent Senators have indicated their intention to observe the negotiations on site in Geneva at an early opportunity.

GENEVA: GOALS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Our group went to Geneva with three goals, and I think we accomplished them all. First, though we are not negotiators, the group has an important substantive role to play in the arms control process. It is to serve as the eyes and ears of the Senate in Geneva and to maintain close contact with the executive branch here in Washington, where negotiating goals and strategies are developed.

We had a number of substantive sessions with members of the negotiating team before the talks with the Soviet delegation actually commenced, and we also had a very informative debriefing immediately following the first negotiating session on March 12. We were asked by Max Kampelman and the other members of his team to respect the confidentiality of the negotiating sessions. Obviously, we are going to honor that request, to avoid in any way jeopardizing the smooth conduct of the talks.

I was pleased our excellent negotiating team—Max Kampelman, John Tower and Mike Glitman dealt with us in a spirit of excellent cooperation and candor. They were interested in the ideas and observations we had to offer. They fielded all of our questions, including some very tough and searching ones. And they actively sought to exchange information with us which might help the negotiating process itself.

In the course of these discussions we passed on the strong concern of the Senate, in the area of Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements. Our negotiators got the message clearly that we are deeply concerned about this issue and they agree that it

must be addressed, in an appropriate way, in the context of the Geneva negotiations.

Our second goal in going to Geneva was to underscore the strong bipartisan support which exists in the Senate, and in fact in the country, for the administration's arms control efforts. The presence of our bipartisan delegation there alone, I think, sent a clear message to the Soviet delegation and to others: The United States is going about the business of arms control in a serious, nonpartisan, and basically unified way. Both in public statements and in our private meetings with our negotiating team, all of the members of the observer group stressed some common themes. We committed ourselves to be as patient as necessary to make sure we get the kind of agreement we want, and we urged our negotiators to persevere in that same spirit, too.

We departed for Geneva unified in our goals and we came back even more unified than before. Because of that, I am convinced that our presence and actions there materially strengthened the hand of our negotiators as these important talks began and helped to improve the long-term prospects for the kind of agreement we all want.

Finally, we went to Geneva with a third objective in mind—to get to know our own negotiators better and to let them know we are behind them. I need not expound for the Senate on the virtues of Max Kampelman, John Tower and Mike Glitman. We know these men well and have enormous respect for them. Let me say, though, that they, along with their able and enthusiastic deputies, have gone beyond their individual talents to form a true team, in concept and in action. They are a credit to the President who picked them and to the country they are serving so well.

MOSCOW: A NEW LEADER

While in Geneva, of course, we learned of the death of Soviet President Chernenko, and we wondered how it might affect the negotiations about to begin. It appears as if the Soviet Union has moved quickly to arrange an orderly transition of leadership, which is essential to the conduct of our bilateral relations. Certainly, it is encouraging that the Soviets decided to go ahead with the arms control talks on schedule and that the chief Soviet negotiator has confirmed the direct support of the new Soviet leader, First Secretary Gorbachev, for the Geneva talks.

I might add that Chernenko's death did make it impossible for the group, on this occasion, to meet directly with the Soviet negotiating team. We have received assurances, however, that on future occasions, onsite Senate observers will have appropriate access to the Soviet negotiators.

WASHINGTON FOLLOWUP

Finally, I would like to let the Senate know briefly of the future plans of the arms control observer group for monitoring the negotiations. Two of our Members, Senators Stevens and Gore, have remained in Geneva for several days to observe the talks. It is the intention of the group that Members will travel to Geneva periodically to observe the talks and that at least one Member will be

present for a substantial portion of the time the talks are going forward.

I would also like to inform the Senate that the distinguished minority leader and I last evening sent a letter to the President, giving him our initial observations from our trip. I ask unanimous consent that the text of our letter to the President be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, in conclusion, let me say that the talks in Geneva are off to a good start. The activities of the observer group are off to a productive start.

We recognize this will be a prolonged process. Nevertheless the events which we observed, and in which we played a part, in Geneva can offer all of us a bit more hope that, at the end of this long road, there may lie the prospect of a significant, balanced, and verifiable arms control agreement.

I ask unanimous consent that the letter we did send to the President be included in the Record.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

U.S. SENATE,
Washington, DC, March 13, 1985.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington.

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Finally, Mr. President, we would be remiss if we did not apprise you of the very positive impression which the negotiating team made on us during our stay in Geneva. Max Kampelman, John Tower, Mike Glitman and their deputies did a great job with us and are obviously doing a great job in preparing for, and conducting, the talks with the Soviet delegation. They are credit to you, to your Administration and to the country they are serving so well.

Sincerely yours,

BOB DOLE,
Majority Leader.
ROBERT C. BYRD,
Minority Leader.

SENATE ARMS CONTROL OBSERVER GROUP AND THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, 10 of the Senators on the arms control observer group traveled to Geneva last Saturday, March 9, 1985, in order to monitor the opening round of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

I believe the trip was an unqualified success from every standpoint. The swift transition of power in the Soviet Union while we were in Geneva high-lighted the feeling that we are at the beginning of a new era, not only in the field of arms control but also in American-Soviet relations in general.

The Senate arms control observer group was established by Senate Resolution 19 on January 3, 1985, and includes a well-balanced and highly knowledgeable cross-section of Senators from both sides of the aisle. It includes the leadership of both the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees as well as other Senators who have been deeply involved in the national security and arms control areas.

A major part of the reason I believe that this short trip to Geneva was a success was the extensive preparation that we engaged in prior to the trip. The group met for long sessions at breakfast, twice weekly for a month, with a variety of experts in this field—including, for example, such outside experts as Zbigniew Brzezinski and James Schlesinger, as well as our negotiating team and the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin. We were, therefore, coversant with the broad outlines of the issues in each of the three negotiating areas: strategic, intermediate, and space weaponry.

The first negotiating session between the United States and Soviet teams was held on Tuesday, March 12, 1985. The second session was held just a few hours ago today.

Prior to the first session, we were provided with extensive briefings by both our three deputy and three chief negotiators. These included extensive confidential discussions of the issues involved. After the first negotiating session, we again conferred with our negotiators and received an extensive debriefing of the details of the negotiating session. I am sure I speak for my colleagues who attended those briefings and debriefings that they were fully informative and satisfactory.

The give and take of discussions between the observer Senators and our negotiators leads me to conclude that the process which we have established will be of long-term value to the Senate and to the administration both.

As Senator Dole and I have communicated by letter to the President yesterday, we believe that we fulfilled the two main goals of our Geneva trip. First, we intended to convey that there is a strong bipartisan consensus supporting the efforts of our team in Geneva. This includes the determination to be very patient in the course of these talks. The talks will be long and arduous. The issues, particularly with the onrush of new technologies over the last decade and into the future, will be staggeringly complex. These will be, unquestionably, the most complicated and difficult negotiations in this field in history.

I made the point to our negotiators over the last few days that I believe it will be American inventiveness upon which the lion's share of ultimate success will depend. It will take our full creative genius to fashion sound solutions to the range of issues, unknowns, and complexities that modern weapons technology presents us with. Just the question of how to verify presently deployed systems such as cruise missiles, much less that largely hidden future of space technologies, is a very demanding task. I do not think the Soviets will exhibit the kind of flexibility and creativity which are peculiarly American. We Americans have to lead them—if they can be led at all, of course.

I also made the point that the Senate observer group is an important resource available to our negotiators. A number of Senators in the group have been deeply involved in fashioning the build-down concept, for example, and also in various kinds of proposals for so-called confidence building measures with the Soviets.

Our second goal on this trip was to demonstrate our commitment to fulfilling the unique and critical role which the Constitution places on the Senate in the area of treatymaking. In this connec-

tion, we must advise and consent to any treaty which may result from these talks. It will take far more than just a cursory understanding of the very difficult and varied questions to be resolved by these agreements for us to properly meet our duty. It will take study and considerable work for the Senate to do justice to the technological as well as the political problems being faced in these negotiations. The group is available to provide counsel and the reaction of the Senate to the issues on the table—if that counsel is desired by our negotiators. We firmly believe that the interplay of ideas that has and will continue to occur with the members of our observer team will be of assistance to our negotiators.

In addition, in the event that a treaty does come before the Senate, the Senate will be in a better position to consider the detailed issues involved in such an agreement. On the other hand, in the event that the negotiations fail, the Senate will be in a better position to understand and make comprehensible to the American people just why that failure occurred.

Our negotiators, led by Max Kampleman and including John Tower and Mike Glitman, and their deputies did a fine job in preparing for the opening of the talks. I am sure my colleagues deeply appreciated their hospitality to us. In addition, our Ambassador to the United States Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, Mr. Gerald Carmen, was a generous, courteous, and helpful host. He had a major role in making our trip a success.

We had intended to meet informally with the Soviet negotiators during our stay, but the death of Mr. Chernenko precluded a meeting at that time. However, the Soviets have accepted the idea of such informal contacts in principle and Secretary Shultz has indicated to us that he believes such contacts will be useful in the future.

We expressed our condolences formally to the Soviet people on the passing of Mr. Chernenko last Tuesday. I take it as a positive sign that the Soviet regime has executed its transition of power in an orderly and swift manner. It has not had any effect on the timetable for the arms control negotiations, and I hope that stability in the Soviet leadership will permit the Soviet negotiators to reach reasonable accommodations on our arms control proposals.

We also had an extensive press conference on Tuesday morning in Geneva. I believe all members of our group expressed themselves fully and in response to a variety of questions. I believe it would be useful for my colleagues for the text of that press conference to be available to them, and intend to place it in the Record at the end of these remarks.

I note, Mr. President, that two members of our group, Senators Stevens and Gore, are in Geneva today to monitor the second negotiating session. It is our intention to have one or more Senators, whenever possible, to be in Geneva while the negotiations are ongoing, and a running summary of the progress of the talks will be available on a confidential basis in the observer group files.

In summary, Mr. President, we had a productive and useful working trip to the opening of these talks from March 9 to 13, 1985. We got to know our negotiators on a personal basis and engaged in extensive discussions with them. The briefings were full and informative, the give and take of value to all concerned. We

came away with the strong feeling of unity that we are all Americans with a common goal—to reach a sound agreement, or series of agreements, if at all possible.

Mr. President, let me associate myself with the remarks that have just been made by the distinguished majority leader. I was very favorably impressed on this trip by the dedication of all the Members of the Senate who are a part of the observer group. I was impressed also with the leadership that was demonstrated by the distinguished majority leader. He went as a very serious participant and as a member of the observer group. He demonstrated great leadership during that trip as we met with our negotiating team and as we met with other U.S. officials during our stay in Geneva.

May I say that if it were not for that solid, serious support by the majority leader, the efforts of the observer group would be, to some extent, in vain. I think that the support of the majority leader lends a strong undergirding of this whole idea of having observers from the Senate in Geneva during the arms control talks.

Mr. President, this observer group can and will make not only a fine contribution but one that is very much needed as the talks go forward. It is important, I think, that we demonstrate that the Senate is bipartisan in this matter, which we view as a nonpartisan matter. It is a matter affecting the safety and security of the people of this country and of the people in other parts of the world. The Senate has demonstrated that it sees its role under the Constitution in connection with the treaty-making powers as a vital role and as a unique role, and the Senate intends to fulfill that role.

As the distinguished majority leader has indicated, some of the members of the observer group are still in Geneva today.

The observer group has the support of the President of the United States, and that is extremely important. It can render a great service. It will be in a position to advise our negotiators if they desire to have the advice and counsel of the Senate. I think they manifested that desire during our visit.

It will also make it possible for us to have more than just a cursory knowledge of what is going on in the negotiations, because we shall have respected Members from both sides of the aisle who will be attending and keeping us informed of progress and developments.

Mr. President, I think it is important that the American people not be led to believe that these negotiations are going to be easy or that they are going to be of a short-lived nature. We have to keep in mind that some of the agreements that we have entered into with the Soviets heretofore have required years of negotiations. As a matter of fact, the MBFR talks have been going on for over 11 years between the Soviets and the Americans, and those talks have not resulted in an agreement as yet. The Soviet negotiators are tough, and they know what their goal is. Although they may make minor modifications from time to time in their approaches to our negotiators, I think we shall find that in the final analysis—or such has been the history of the INF negotiations—the Soviets are merely doing a little window dressing along the way, and they always come out at the same end.

Fortunately, our negotiators at the INF talks have seen this and they, too, have been purposeful in their goals. They have held out for an agreement that would be equitable and that would provide for verification necessary to protect this country's security interests.

The Soviets have certain advantages; we have certain advantages. The Soviets are going to feel that the advantages that are theirs should continue to be theirs and that the advantages that are ours should be negotiable. That is the kind of negotiators they are, and they know that the American people are usually impatient to get on with things and not spend much time. They are accustomed to instant potatoes and instant cake mix, instant this and instant that, instant everything else.

The Soviets very well may believe that if they just sit tight and take their time, the Americans will cave in. Well, this is too sober and too serious an enterprise, Mr. President, for the Americans to cave in. I would rather see no agreement at all than to see a bad agreement into which the American negotiators have been stampeded by political or other pressures. These arms talks are for keeps, and the outcome of these negotiations is going to affect not only the people of the world today but also the people of the world in my grandchildren's children's time. It is a very important undertaking and we should demonstrate great patience and firmness and at the same time attempt to understand the other side's problems and try to work tenaciously and patiently to develop an outcome that will be worthy of approval by this body.

Mr. President, I congratulate the distinguished majority leader on his leadership during our trip to Geneva, and I congratulate the Members on both sides of the aisle who were there. They are indeed very conscientious Senators and they know that it is going to take a long time to get a good agreement. Senator Dole and I have communicated by letter to the President already and we will continue to attempt as best we can to work with the negotiators in a useful way. Those who participate as negotiators are going to have to deal with the technologies that are onrushing and fast changing in this era, and it will require a great deal of inventiveness and innovativeness on the part of our negotiators. I think if we will look at the summary of the Special Consultative Group Progress Report to the NATO ministers in December 1983, we will see that our negotiators in that instance were innovative, but we will also see that the Soviet negotiators were obstinate, they were intractable, they were unmovable. The Soviet negotiators walked out of those talks. I am glad they have decided to renew the talks.

I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that I may insert into the Record the transcript of the news conference in which the distinguished majority leader and I and others in the observer group participated while we were in Geneva and I also ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD the summary of the SCG Progress Report to the NATO Ministers. It is a report that is 49 pages in length.

I would say it would be worth the time and attention of not only every Member of this body but also all who read the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD wherever they may be. I think it would be well that they read it; it will certainly open the eyes of those who read this

report as to just what kind of negotiators the American negotiators are working and meeting with, and it will thoroughly debunk any idea on the part of anyone, I think, that these talks are going to last only a few days or a few weeks. It is going to take months or years. There may be interim agreements along the way, if we can achieve them. There will be no miracles worked and none should be expected.

These are talks of the utmost gravity and importance, and I hope our negotiators will be firm and patient, because only then can we hope to achieve an agreement that is in the mutual interests of both the Soviets and ourselves.

Report From Senator Ted Stevens on Return Trip to Geneva, April 15–18, 1985

From April 15 to April 18, 1985, I traveled to Geneva to observe the U.S. delegations to the arms control negotiations again. This was the penultimate week of the first round of negotiations. As co-chairman of the Observer Group, I was given every opportunity to observe staff meetings, ask questions, offer private counsel, review delegation documents, and consult with the U.S. Ambassadors.

Individual meetings arranged for me at the Botanic Building in Geneva with each of the principal U.S. negotiators were of great value. In this regard, I met with Ambassador Max Kampelman, Ambassador John Tower, Ambassador Mike Glitman, Ambassador Warren Zimmerman, Ambassador Henry Cooper, Ambassador Ron Lehman, Ambassador John Woodworth, and General Richard Ellis. Each is extraordinarily capable and every one was helpful in answering my specific questions.

Also, an informal meeting was arranged between Soviet Ambassadors Karpov and Obukhov and Ambassadors Kampelman, Tower, Glitman and myself to discuss arms control issues. This meeting lasted two and a half hours. I took the opportunity to state my concerns about the Krasnoyarsk radar, among other issues, and the Soviet Ambassadors presented their points of view on these and other issues.

In addition, I observed the regular briefings conducted by each negotiating subgroup: Space and Defense, START, and INF. Before each day's particular subgroup met with the Soviets, the group held a pre-briefing to hammer out the final text of the day's plenary statement. After the day's session, the team discussed the plenary and post-plenary discussions before drafting a reporting cable for Washington. These pre-briefings and de-briefings offered each negotiating group an opportunity to share ideas, and insights, and to report the essence of informal discussions which occurred in the post-plenaries.

Outside the negotiating building, I arranged informal background discussions with the major American print and radio reporters covering the talks. Aware of the rule of confidentiality adhered to by the U.S. negotiators, I strongly believe that it is valuable for the reporters covering the talks to learn the perspectives of a U.S. Senate Observer, including our views on the mood of the talks, the prospects for the talks, the substantial and urgent con-

cerns of the Senate regarding verification and compliance issues, and the purposes and objectives of the Senate Observers. It is also valuable for the Senate to hear the perspectives of the media, since media perceptions undoubtedly will play an important role this year here and in Europe in shaping the atmosphere surrounding the negotiations.

In this regard, although I found the U.S. negotiators uniformly capable, energetic and cautiously optimistic about their tasks, I found the media already developing a sense of impatience with the lack of obvious public results. I continue to state that after just 54 hours of talks in round one, it is far too early to be pessimistic about the talks, or even to have expected more than an exploratory first six weeks. SALT I took two and a half years and SALT II took almost seven. There are opportunities ahead in these talks as well. One of the roles of the Senate Observers at this point ought to be to counsel patience on the part of everyone associated with the talks or observing the talks, and to find helpful ways to take advantage of the opportunities for substantive progress.

During my visit to Geneva, I also spent time examining the needs of the negotiating team for a secure, efficient physical plant with sufficient support for it to operate. The negotiating team is housed in the Botanic Building, which is also the site of the offices of a half dozen other organizations, including several non-U.S. groups. There are even common walls between the U.S. space and the offices of some of these organizations. Also, there are more than 90 staff members of the U.S. team in a space that formerly was used regularly by only half that number. For these reasons, I have great concern about space, security, support and espionage. I have been told that requirements for word processors, printers, safes, some personal computers, electricity, and secure telephone lines will be met before the second round commences on May 30. ACDA and the State Department made this a top priority, and members of the Senate Observer Group gave their full support to the decision.

Concerning the building itself, the Congress will likely be asked this summer to consider a supplemental appropriation for the cost of erecting a new building for the U.S. arms control negotiating teams. This building would be more efficient and more secure than the Botanic Building. It should be a permanent site for U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations which will occur for many years to come. I will urge the Congress to give this proposal serious consideration if the Congress is asked to provide funds for the building.